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Abstract
Local Currencies, Local Exchange Trading Systems, and Time Banks are all part of a new
social movement that aims to restrict money’s purchasing power within a certain geo-
graphic area, or within a certain community. According to their proponents, these
restrictions may contribute to building sustainable local economies, supporting local
businesses and creating “warmer” social relations. This article inquires whether the
overall enthusiasm that surrounds alternative currencies is justified. It argues that the
potential benefits of these currencies are not sufficient to justify the restrictions they
impose on money’s purchasing power. Turning these currencies into effective channels
of change, by increasing their scope and their strength, could severely hinder the pursuit
of social justice, in a way that is probably not even necessary for achieving their objec-
tives. The paper concludes that large-scale limitations of money’s purchasing power are,
therefore, undesirable.
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1. Introduction
A large variety of new alternative currencies has appeared in recent decades, as a way to
challenge or to complement the official, dominant currencies. Local currencies, Local
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exchange trading systems, Carbon currencies, Times banks and Regional currencies, are
all examples of this new trend. Despite their apparent variety, what they all have in
common, and what sets them apart from official currencies such as euros or dollars, is
that their possible uses are limited in some way: they are valid only within some geo-
graphic area, or within some community, or for specific goods and services.1 These cur-
rencies have benefited from enthusiastic support from academics (Blanc, 2018; Fare and
Ould Ahmed, 2017) and political activists alike (Derudder, 2014). According to their pro-
ponents, the restrictions they impose on money’s purchasing power allows them to bring
about important benefits. They argue that they may help to build sustainable local econ-
omies (Lietaer et al., 2012), support local businesses (Gregory, 2009) or create “good” or
“warmer” social relations (Servet et al., 1999).
The purpose of this paper is to inquire whether the overall enthusiasm that surrounds
alternative currencies is justified. It aims to fulfil a gap in the literature, which has mainly
focused on evaluating their empirical impacts on society and the environment (e.g.
Marshall and O’Neill, 2018; Michel and Hudon, 2015) and on analyzing the moral moti-
vations of citizens supporting such initiatives (Blanc and Fare, 2016; Meyer and Hudon,
2017, 2018). Few authors, however, have studied the normative implications of these cur-
rencies (for an attempt, see Mildenberger, 2019; Larue et al., 2022). This article aims to
show that these currencies give rise to important normative problems that deserve careful
examination. At first sight, this may not be obvious: currently, the use of these currencies
is purely voluntary and not very widespread. Why would they be an issue for justice?
My reply to this question starts in section 2, where I introduce the main specific traits
of alternative currencies. I then delineate the case in their favour. I show that what ulti-
mately may justify the existence and growth of alternative currencies is their potential
economic, social and environmental benefits, that is, the benefits that would arise if
they reached wider adoption and larger circulation. The importance of the word “poten-
tial” is not always grasped by proponents of alternative currencies. On the one hand, as
we shall see in section 2, enthusiastic support for these currencies abound in the theore-
tical literature. On the other hand, the empirical part of the literature, overall, holds that
these currencies have not been able to deliver on their promises (Marshall and O’Neill,
2018; Michel and Hudon, 2015). In this paper, I attempt to make sense of these somewhat
contradictory claims by arguing that their benefits are primarily potential, that is, that they
have a chance to materialize only if alternative currencies achieve wider adoption. In
other words, the defence of alternative currencies presupposes that they can and
should circulate much more widely within society, as some authors have consistently
argued (e.g. Lietaer et al., 2012; Michel and Hudon, 2015).
Widespread use of alternative currencies will perhaps increase their chance of achiev-
ing their objectives, but it will also give rise to several issues of justice. The three central
sections of this paper argue that the potential benefits of these currencies are not sufficient
to justify the restrictions they impose on money’s purchasing power, and that these ben-
efits need to be balanced against their potential consequences for social justice. First, the
greater the weight of these currencies in the economy, the more they will reduce people’s
real opportunities (section 3). Second, their growth would also unjustly affect how the
burdens of reducing environmental harms are distributed among consumers (section
4). Third, it would hinder the possibility to redistribute incomes and wealth in a just
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and efficient way (section 5). I show that the restrictions that these currencies would
impose are disproportionate to their aims, even if these aims may be valuable. Their det-
rimental consequences on justice can hardly be justified by the pursuit of other valuable
goals, such as environmental sustainability or social cohesion, for there exist other
reforms, such as environmental taxation, that might achieve similar objectives without
curtailing the pursuit of social justice.
The main conclusion of this article is that there is a dilemma between what these cur-
rencies can achieve and how they may affect justice. Currently, small-scale experiments
are not achieving any significant outcome. As they hardly have any impact on social
justice either, there is no reason for the state to forbid their development. However,
turning these currencies into effective channels of change, by increasing their scope
and their strength, would severely hurt justice, in a way that is probably not even neces-
sary for achieving their objectives. Large-scale limitations of money’s purchasing power
are, therefore, undesirable.
2. The Case in favour of alternative currencies
What is the appeal of alternative currencies? What do they promise to achieve? Let me
illustrate the case in their favour with a simple stylized example. Take a small village,
somewhere in Europe, that has been somehow left behind economically and socially:
the young have moved to the cities, and local shops are struggling to compete with super-
markets, so that money flows away and fails to sustain the local economy. Moreover,
environmental issues add up to these economic and social problems. Most consumer
goods come from outside of the village, which generates pollution, waste and other envir-
onmental problems.
This is where Local currencies, Local Exchange Trading systems (LETS), and other
alternative currencies, come in. Their proponents claim that, because they restrict
exchanges locally, or within a community, these currencies can best serve certain
social, environmental or economic purposes, even at a relatively small scale. In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, I first explain their principal characteristics, then show what these
restrictions entail, and finally review some of their key potential benefits.
What distinguishes these currencies from official currencies such as euros or dollars is
that their uses are limited according to some criteria: they are valid only within some geo-
graphic area (Local currencies), or within some community (LETS, Time Banks), or for
buying specific goods and services (For a detailed presentation, see Blanc, 2018; Lietaer
et al., 2012). Let me present two of the most widespread forms of alternative currencies.
Local currencies are valid only locally, to buy goods produced (or, at least, processed)
locally. People can have access to Local currencies either by selling some products, or
by exchanging euros or dollars against them. Each local currency relies on an organiza-
tion, usually not-for-profit and run by volunteers, that keeps track of all transactions and
stores on a bank account an amount of euros (or dollars) equivalent to the amount of
Local currencies in circulation. So no money creation takes place here. LETS, on the
other hand, are a complex form of barter between members of a local community. In
LETS, the account of each member is credited each time this member provides a
service and debited each time she receives a service from another member (Servet
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et al., 1999). Thus, money creation takes place through the exchange of services, and
money takes the form of debt certificates, valid only within a certain community of
members. Finally, note that current regulations are rather permissive with regard to the
creation and use of alternative currencies: no formal barriers presently exist to prevent
their spread (Attout et al., 2013). On the contrary, public authorities have often encour-
aged the development of such initiatives (Blanc and Fare, 2013). In contrast, banks and
other financial institutions have had almost no role to play in these schemes. Actually,
there is no market for alternative currencies. As of now, it thus remains impossible to
exchange them for one another.
The key mechanism that drives their impact on the environment and society is that they
restrict the purchasing power of money locally, or within a community. What do these
restrictions entail? First, alternative currencies will effectively localize the economy if,
and only if, they are not convertible into euros or other universal currencies. For their
impact on the local economywould disappear if they could buy any good produced world-
wide. While the possibility to convert one’s money might reassure potential users, it also
undermines the capacity of these currencies to effectively impact the economy or the envir-
onment, as people can escape local restrictions by buying back dollars or euros. This point
is often overlooked. Arnsperger (2011: 10) and Douthwaite (2012: 191–192), for instance,
take for granted that alternative currencies should remain convertible into euros or dollars.
However, this would contradict their purpose of restricting the use of money locally, or
within a community. Second, these currencies should be sufficiently widespread: if they
make up for only a tiny part of people’s income and wealth, they will be unlikely to effect-
ively impose any restriction on their behaviour.
What is the justification for such restrictions? How could they be of any help for the
villagers left behind in the example above? First, when exchanges take place within a
local area and involve the members of a relatively small community, they may exhibit
certain qualities, related to the personal sphere, that differ starkly from the impersonal
character of global exchanges. For instance, LETS are usually put forward as means of
social integration, which foster informal exchanges and mutual assistance, thanks to
the fact that they circulate only within a given community of users (Servet et al.,
1999). Because they concern only a small group of committed participants, they may
allow people at the margin of society, who do not take part in common social and eco-
nomic activities, to engage in local exchanges, to meet people there and, consequently,
to build a new social network (Oliver Sanz, 2016). Second, through their ability to restrict
exchanges to the local level, these currencies may also exhibit some economic benefits for
local and regional economies, by helping local producers and fostering local exchanges
(Gregory, 2009; Williams, 1996). Finally, some authors also think they may play an
important role in a sustainable economy: by putting limits to global exchanges, they
may allow to reduce pollution and transportation costs, and raise awareness about envir-
onmental issues (Brooks, 2015; Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013).
Their appeal is thus threefold. First, they appear to tackle genuine social, economic
and environmental issues. Second, they do not require the involvement of the State, or
other “big” institutional actors. They are bottom-up small-scale experiments, driven by
groups of citizens at the local level. Third, they provide a simple and (at first sight) harm-
less solution to these problems: make sure money circulates locally, or within a small
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community of users. That latter claim is of great importance. The benefits of alternative
currencies depend on their ability to restrict the purchasing power of money locally. As
already argued, if local currencies could buy any good produced worldwide, their impact
on the local economy would disappear.
In this article, I shall not challenge the fact that many local communities around the
world are facing serious economic, social or environmental threats, such as the loss of
local jobs, the closure of local shops, and the related environmental harms of globaliza-
tion. The capacity of small-scale alternative currencies to tackle these issues is more ques-
tionable, though. Recent empirical findings have cast doubts on their alleged benefits.
These currencies have not had any significant impact on the economy or the environment
(Blanc, 2018: 96–101; Dittmer, 2013; Marshall and O’Neill, 2018; Michel and Hudon,
2015). Some authors did find some positive correlation between the use of such curren-
cies and social cohesion, though (Fare and Ould Ahmed, 2017; Graugaard, 2012;
Nakazato and Hiramoto, 2012; Ould Ahmed, 2015). Michel and Hudon (2015: 168) sum-
marize these findings by writing that they contribute to “building communities of trust,
support and stronger relationships [while] fostering social inclusion of excluded
groups”. Similarly, Fare and Ould Ahmed (2017: 18) conclude their overview of the lit-
erature by claiming that these currencies have the potential to promote the “social uses of
money”, even if that potential might not be fully realized. However, several authors have
also raised doubts on their real social impact. Already at the advent of Local currencies,
more than 20 years ago, Peacock (2000: 55) noted that “the empirical evidence shows a
strong bias towards those people in gainful employment and those who are well-educated
and well-off”, a conclusion which is shared by Aldridge and Patterson (2002) and
Bowring (1998). More recently, Blanc (2018: 71–72) has come to a similar conclusion
and acknowledged that these currencies have rarely delivered on their promises to
strengthen social cohesion.
One possible explanation for this lack of impact is the fact that their circulation
remains extremely limited in comparison to official currencies (Fare and Ould Ahmed,
2017). We could conjecture that alternative currencies would deliver on their promises
if only their size reached a sufficient threshold. In other words, all the benefits listed
above are mainly potential benefits. The potential nature of the benefits of alternative cur-
rencies explains why so many authors have argued that their weight in the economy
should grow (Lietaer et al., 2012; Michel and Hudon, 2015). They contend that even a
slight increase in the use of these currencies might bring about important benefits, espe-
cially for the environment, as they would then be able to localize the economy and reduce
pollution induced by global trade.
This article wishes to take these proposals seriously. What if it were true that their ben-
efits were real? What if alternative currencies could in fact deliver on their promises? At
first sight, assuming that they would be successful if wider adoption was achieved may
seem controversial. How alternative currencies would work on a large scale is simply
unknown (Larue, 2020b). Moreover, for now, these currencies have largely failed to
deliver on their promises. How plausible is the assumption that they would suddenly
be able to achieve their goals if only they could grow?
This assumption does not aim at empirical plausibility. Its main purpose is to take pro-
ponents of alternative currencies at their word. The case in their favor almost entirely
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relies on speculations on their potential benefits. As I have just argued, many of their pro-
ponents believe that they could deliver on their promises if only they could grow. This
article aims to play by the same game and show that, even if we are extremely charitable
towards alternative currencies, we have very good reasons to object to their growth. A
second justification for this assumption is that it allows to set aside endless empirical con-
troversies. Empirical speculations are probably unavoidable when discussing monetary
reforms. As for other radical reforms such as basic income or sovereign money, introdu-
cing alternative currencies on a large scale would entail many institutional, social, and
economic transformations that are hard to foresee. Moreover, the empirical literature is
presently unable to provide any indication concerning their potential success or failure
if they grew bigger. So I shall be charitable and assume that they will be able to have
a significant impact. I will also be honest and consider all the other possible consequences
of that growth, including its potential effects on social justice.
In short, studying an ideal scenario where they are successful and more widespread
will allow to determine whether supporting these currencies does in fact make sense. It
will also illustrate that the importance of the empirical controversy on their impact
might be exaggerated: if it turns out that they are empirically unsuccessful, we have
empirical reasons to doubt their relevance; alternatively, if it turns out that they would
be successful if their reached wider adoption, the following sections will show that,
even under very ideal empirical assumptions, we nevertheless have normative reasons
to oppose the growth of alternative currencies. For if one takes the case in their favour
seriously, one must also take into account how increasing their weight in the economy
could threaten social justice.
Before turning to the heart of the argument, note that assuming that their weight in the
economy increases will have several important methodological consequences for our ana-
lysis, which need to be spelled out very clearly. First, it would mean that the use of alter-
native currencies would no longer be voluntary. If one takes seriously the claim that they
should grow, one must acknowledge that this requires active support from the state. For,
when their use is voluntary, they usually fail to achieve widespread adoption (Blanc,
2018). Moreover, their growth would also entail that they would affect the well-being
of many who might not have wished to use them, as increased use will lead to increased
restrictions on money’s purchasing power. For these two reasons, it is justified to inquire
whether increasing their weight in the economy will raise concerns for justice. Even if
imposing tighter limits on the purchasing power of money might actually achieve
certain social or environmental objectives, we must balance it against its potential
threats to social justice. I will show that there are several tensions between the possible
environmental and social achievements of this proposal and its harmful consequences on
justice. As we shall see, the strength of these tensions is partly an empirical matter (are
these achievements real and effective?), partly an issue of values (do environmental or
social benefits outweigh the harms done to justice?).
3. Effects on opportunities
The first tension concerns the effect of alternative currencies on opportunities. As the
weight of these currencies grow, they will increasingly restrict the purchasing power
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of money locally, or within a community of users. Limiting the purchasing power of
money to a specific area or community will inevitably restrict what a person’s income
and wealth can buy, that is, his or her opportunities. Clearly, when you receive a 100€
bill, your possibilities are much larger than when you receive a voucher only valid
locally or within a specific community. Therefore, the greater the weight of such curren-
cies in the economy, the more they will restrain people’s opportunities. Is that justified?
Currently, as has already been stressed, the use of these currencies is purely voluntary.
People may thus agree to receive part of their salary in local currencies, or to exchange
goods and services for those currencies. Clearly, no injustice arises if these are voluntary
exchanges. Problems of justice may arise if generalizing the use of these currencies
becomes public policy, that is, if a state, a regional entity or a municipality enforces its
use and promotes its growth. Suppose a government is convinced by the claim of propo-
nents of alternative currencies that achieving certain environmental, social or economic
objective requires expanding their use, for instance through (partial) payment of salaries
and benefits in ACs. In that case, acceptance would no longer be voluntary, and oppor-
tunities would be reduced without consent.
This clearly seems unjust. Opportunities greatly matter to us, because we usually care
about the freedom to do what we might want to do with the resources we have at our dis-
posal. I take that intuition to be one core element of egalitarian theories of justice. Despite
their many disagreements, most egalitarians stress that one of the main purposes of justice
is to endow all individuals with the real opportunity to pursue one’s own reasonable life
plan. Dworkin (1985: 192) claims that resources should be “devoted to satisfying the
ambitions” of each individual . Sen (1992: 36) emphasizes the importance of providing
people with the adequate “means to freedom”, which echoes Rawls’ claim that political
liberalism should guarantee “sufficient all-purpose means for citizens to make intelligent
and effective use of their freedoms” (Rawls, 2005: xxxix). In a similar vein, Van Parijs
(1995: 25) claims that a just society is one in which “each person has the greatest possible
opportunity to do whatever she might want to do.”
The proponents of alternative currencies could reply that the entire point of their pro-
posal is to restrict people’s opportunities, so as to achieve certain environmental, eco-
nomic, or social benefits. Let’s assume, for now, that these are valuable objectives. We
thus face a trade-off: If the circulation and use of alternative currencies increase, we
can assume that they will have some positive effects (on the environment, for instance)
but also detrimental consequences for social justice. This creates an acute problem for
alternative currencies, for one cannot have the benefits without paying the costs. The
only way to weaken the effects on justice would be to put limits on their circulation.
Some, for instance, may argue that people could be allowed to keep a significant
amount of their salary in euros, or that local currencies could be convertible into
euros. As was demonstrated in the previous section however, that move would reduce
their capacity to impact society in a significant way. If one wants to retain a significant
role for alternative currencies, that trade-off is unescapable.
One way to “solve” that dilemma would be to play down the value of their objectives
and to get rid of these currencies entirely. I would like to take these goals seriously
though, and inquire whether reaching them really requires generalizing the use of
these currencies. A theory of justice that calls for the fair distribution of real opportunities
Larue 7
among all citizens would certainly advocate some regulations to avoid environmental
harms, for instance. Actually, Rawls often insists on the “intelligent” use of freedom
and Sen attaches great importance to people’s opportunities to do “what they have
reasons to value”.2 That is, life plans should be in some sense reasonable, which
means that people should have reasons to embrace them, that they should be capable
of reflecting upon their conception of the good life. It also means that these plans may
be revised if it happens that they harm others in an unjustified way or if they do not
comply with the demands of a just society. The latter point entails that justice does
allow for some limitations of people’s opportunities in some specific cases. The existence
of environmental harm, for instance, provides a very good reason to limit the capacity of
some people to pollute in order to protect the well-being of others (including future gen-
erations). However, alleviating such harms need not require the abandonment of the uni-
versality of money, especially if there exist other policy options, such as environmental
taxation, that can achieve the same aim with fewer restrictions.
The general point I want to make is the following. The goals of alternative currencies
are certainly legitimate. Local communities across Europe and elsewhere, especially in
rural areas, do suffer from serious economic, social and environmental problems.
However, increasing the weight of alternative currencies is a disproportionate response
to these problems. Even if it might bring about some benefits, it would restrict
people’s opportunities in a way that is both harmful for justice and not necessary to
achieve those benefits. In the following paragraphs, I shall argue that, for each of their
objectives, there exists a policy that is both as efficient and less harmful for justice
than generalizing the use of alternative currencies. I shall study in detail the case of
their environmental objectives, because they are not controversial and have attracted
much hope and enthusiasm (e.g. Lietaer et al., 2012). In fact, the promise to tackle envir-
onmental harm seems a very strong reason to support these currencies, and one should
thus consider it thoroughly. My analysis shall be more succinct on their economic and
social objectives, for the argument will in essence be the same. Moreover, these may
be more controversial objectives, which may not gather universal agreement.
A good candidate to tackle environmental harm is environmental taxation, understood
as a per unit tax on polluting goods. Ideally, the optimal environmental tax rate for a given
product should equal the marginal environmental damage generated by that product, so
that its price takes into account the negative externality of consuming or producing that
product. Even if determining the exact tax rate might be difficult, several studies have
shown that environmental taxation was among the most efficient ways to fight pollution
and global warming (Fullerton et al., 2008; Hammar et al., 2004; Sterner, 2007). On the
contrary, so far, existing experiments of alternative currencies have not impacted the
economy in a significant way (Michel and Hudon, 2015). However, we lack empirical
evidence on the efficiency of increasing the weight of these currencies in the economy,
for nothing close to a large-scale experiment has ever seen the light. One of the largest
experiments, the WIR in Switzerland, is still extremely small compared to the Swiss
economy (Stodder, 2009).
One possible conclusion of that empirical comparison would be that these currencies
do not stand a chance to influence the economy, the environment or social cohesion in
any meaningful way. Imposing an environmental tax seems more likely to reduce the
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environmental impact of economic activities than encouraging the use of currencies that
strictly restrict money’s purchasing power. This conclusion may be too hasty, though, for
alternative currencies have not had the chance to prove their worth on a large scale. For
the sake of the argument then, and to give full credit to proponents of alternative curren-
cies, I will take a slightly unrealistic step. Recall that the aim of this article is to see what
would happen if these currencies would become more widespread. In particular, I want to
know whether increasing their scope and size, as some of their proponents advocate,
would not come at a cost for social justice. Therefore, I shall make the assumption that
taxation and the generalization of alternative currencies can both tackle environmental
degradations with the same effectiveness. That assumption puts into parentheses the
empirical differences between the two policies and makes possible to focus on their nor-
mative underpinnings. Its purpose is to show that we do not simply have empirical
reasons to doubt the effectiveness of alternative currencies, but also normative ones.
Given this assumption, which option should one favour?
Even if we assume they have the same effectiveness, I shall argue that we should
favour environmental taxation, because it restricts people’s opportunities much less
than a policy that would increase the weight of alternative currencies. To do so, let me
specify what I mean by opportunities. In this paper, opportunities are said to be formal
if they merely amount to the absence of legal constraints. Opportunities are real if they
entail both the formal freedom and the concrete possibility to perform some action or
to have access to some good. Both conditions are necessary and sufficient to define a
real opportunity.3 One may have the concrete possibility, that is, the adequate means,
to perform an act without having the formal freedom to perform it (e.g. theft). One
may also have the formal freedom without the concrete possibility (e.g. buy a house).
Comparing the impact of different policies on people’s concrete possibilities is a dif-
ficult task. For different environmental policies affect different people’s concrete possi-
bilities very differently (their income, their wealth, or their knowledge, for instance).
Environmental taxation, for instance, can impact people’s incomes and wealth differently
depending on whether one lives in the countryside or in town, and whether one works
full-time or part-time. Moreover, people may be (at least partly) held responsible for
their choices, so that the effect of environmental policy on their plans of life may not
be necessarily unjust, if one can show that they actually chose to live in a certain way
or a certain place. I shall leave these distributive worries aside for now, and shall
return to them in the next two sections. I do not deny their importance but want to con-
sider another normative aspect of these environmental policies first.
Contrary to concrete possibilities, the way a given policy affects different individuals’
formal opportunities does not vary across persons (or not much). The law applies to
everyone equally. So one can compare how different policies affect people’s formal
opportunities. I contend that, among policies that have the same impact on the environ-
ment, we should choose the one that least restricts people’s formal opportunities. This
claim is, I think, uncontroversial and in line with very basic and widely shared intuitions
in favour of liberty.
Taxation does restrict people formal freedom but less than alternative currencies (if
widespread). In some cases, the social or environmental cost of producing, transporting
or consuming a given product may be so high that it may require punishing rates of
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taxation or the complete ban of the product. In general, however, taxation maintains the
formal freedom to do whatever one wants to do (including the consumption of polluting
goods) while making the concrete possibility to consume or produce a function of its cost
for others (if it is adequately designed). On the contrary, increasing the weight of alter-
native currencies would severely restrict the formal freedom of consuming goods pro-
duced outside the local or the community level. Therefore, if a choice needs to be
made among these two alternatives (environmental taxation or alternative currencies),
and if one assumes equal effectiveness of both alternatives, environmental taxation
should clearly be preferred. In sum, one need not renounce money’s universality in
order to achieve sustainability: giving a greater place to alternative currencies would
be both unjustly and unnecessarily restrictive. They may still have a place within the
monetary system, but one small enough so as not to constitute a problem for social
justice. Generalizing the use of alternative currencies is thus only a second-best option:
if, for some reason (political or otherwise), taxation is not feasible, then the latter strategy
may be acceptable. I am agnostic concerning which of these two policy proposals is the
most politically feasible. My guess is that taxation is more likely to be implemented at
some point, for it does not require a profound systemic change, contrary to the introduc-
tion on a large scale of alternative currencies.
What about other objectives? As we have seen, alternative currencies are often praised
for bringing back social life where it had faded away (e.g. Servet et al., 1999). Similarly to
environmental objectives, we may wonder whether promoting alternative currencies is
the best alternative for achieving social objectives. If we assume, as I have done so
far, that they will deliver on their social promises if their size increases, then we
should also assume that they will also negatively impact people wider opportunities.
I think other options, such as tax-funded social and cultural centres, or public
libraries, may bring about similar social benefits, without the same unpalatable effects
on opportunities. Though these are financed through taxation, they restrict people’s
formal freedom much less that a policy that would encourage the growth of alternative
currencies. The same argument thus applies to both the environmental and social
objectives.
In response, one could argue that, contrary to social and cultural centres, or to envir-
onmental taxation, alternative currency schemes need not be funded nor supported by
public authorities. This is a misconception, though. Currently, alternative currencies do
not require any support from the state (though, many do receive some support, see
Attout et al. (2013)). However, if one takes seriously the argument that they need to
grow, one must acknowledge that their use must no longer remain voluntary, but that
it should be actively encouraged, if not imposed. The fact that their use is presently
strictly voluntary is actually one reason why they have failed to achieve widespread adop-
tion (Blanc, 2018). Therefore, increasing their use does require active support from the
state, similarly to environmental taxation or public libraries.
Finally, what about their economic benefits? One may ask, first, whether it is justified
to protect the local economy of a village, a town, or a region against foreign competition.
Tackling pollution or social exclusion seems, at first sight, a valuable goal. But why
would the economy of this particular village matter more than the economy of
another? This raises complex concerns about economic protectionism that fall beyond
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the purpose of this article. Whether or not one shares these worries, we can have doubts
that increasing the weight of alternative currencies would be the best strategy to protect
the local economy. Taxation, quotas, or other protectionist policies may do the job more
efficiently. I do not want to explore these possibilities any further, though, for I do not feel
comfortable defending protectionism or protectionist policies. I just want to point out
that, similarly to policies aimed at fostering social cohesion or environmental sustainabil-
ity, protectionist policies should pass the following test: assuming that their objective is
valuable, do they achieve it at the lowest cost for justice?
In this section, I argued that part of the answer concerns their effects on opportunities.
On that regard, I showed that we can find policy options that are both empirically more
promising and ethically less problematic than the policy that would consist in increasing
the weight of alternative currencies in the economy. On the empirical side of the compari-
son, despite the fact that we lack adequate data to evaluate their effects, alternative cur-
rencies clearly appear as a weak candidate. On the normative side, and even if we assume
equal effectiveness of different policies, the greater the weight of these currencies in the
economy, the more they would reduce people’s opportunities. I thus concluded that we
should prefer policies that can achieve the same environmental, social or economic pur-
poses while having a smaller negative impact on opportunities. The next section focuses
on another important aspect of justice: the just distribution of the burdens of reducing
environmental harm.
4. Effects on the distribution of burdens
My second objection concerns the distribution of the burdens of reducing environmental
harm. It thus concentrates on the alleged environmental benefits of alternative currencies
and leaves aside other objectives (to which I shall return in the next section). Reducing
environmental harm is likely to be burdensome for individuals, as they will have to
consume less of certain goods or at a higher price. How should these burdens be distrib-
uted? If one agrees that people should be held responsible for the cost that their choices
entail for others, one relatively uncontroversial answer will be the “polluter pays” prin-
ciple, or the idea that those who cause environmental harm (e.g. pollution) should pay
for it.
In practice, the answer to this question is a little more complex, for justice and effi-
ciency do not always go along with each other. A policy may lead to a just distribution
of burdens, but be inefficient at reducing pollution. Conversely, a policy may efficiently
tackle pollution, but fail to distribute burdens in a fair way. So which of these two should
we choose? One way to avoid that problem is to leave the empirical part of the question
aside. As I argued in section 3, the empirical literature is rather enthusiastic about envir-
onmental taxation (Fullerton et al., 2008). However, we do not have any data on
large-scale experiments of alternative currencies. It may thus be difficult to compare
how these two policies would reduce environmental harm. In this section, I will thus
leave empirical matters aside and focus instead on the distributive consequences of
these policies. In order to be able to make that normative comparison, I shall again
assume that environmental taxation and the generalization of alternative currencies
have the same ability to reduce environmental harm. That assumption may be
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controversial, but it will allow me to compare these policies in a way that is as charitable
as possible to alternative currencies.
Note that each policy aims at reducing environmental harm through different means
and thus involves a different distribution of burdens . Taxation increases the opportu-
nity cost of consumption and/or production for those who cause harm.4 The generaliza-
tion of alternative currencies in the economy, on the other hand, aims to reduce
environmental harm by banning certain forms of trade altogether. Let’s analyse each
policy in turn.
If we take a look at these currencies in their present form, we will notice that they put
the burden of reducing environmental harm on the benevolent, that is, on those willing to
use these currencies, who are not necessarily the same as the polluters. As their use is
purely voluntary, only those who wish to pay the cost of consuming local products
while giving up on global ones will effectively pay it. That generous attitude might be
praiseworthy but should not become a generalized rule for monetary policy. If implemen-
ted, the generalization of alternative currencies would entail that everybody will equally
bear the costs of reducing pollution, for everybody will be barred from buying non-local
products. It would have the same consequences for those who pollute as well as for those
who do not, thus violating the “polluter pays principle”. Therefore, generalizing the use
of these currencies would imply that everyone has to pay for the harmful consequences of
certain acts for which some do not have any responsibility. The greater their weight in the
economy, the more they would impose the same restrictions on every economic agent,
whatever one’s consumer behaviour.
Environmental taxation, on the contrary, will make those who cause harm pay for it.
Taxation maintains the formal freedom to do whatever one wants to do (including the
consumption of polluting goods) while making the concrete possibility to consume or
produce a commodity a function of its cost for others. In principle, the greater that
cost, the greater the tax, and the lower the concrete possibility to consume or produce
a given product. In sum, if we assume that both policies have the same likelihood to
fulfil their environmental objective, taxing people for the harmful impact of their behav-
iour on the environment might yield a better combination of freedom and responsibility
than the generalization of alternative currencies. It better respects people’s formal
freedom while making people pay for the cost that their consumption or production
entails for others. Therefore, the universality of money and environmental sustainability
are not necessarily incompatible. Again, they might be no need to abandon money’s uni-
versality in order to achieve sustainability.
In response to my argument, one could argue that the burden of tax might fall dispro-
portionately on the poor. For instance, a flat tax on motor fuels may hit the poor more than
the rich because it reduces the disposable income of the former proportionally more than
the latter. However, recent empirical research has shown that environmental taxation was
not as regressive as it is often assumed to be (Fullerton et al., 2008; Sterner, 2012).
Concerning fuel taxes, for instance, Sterner (2012) does not find any evidence of regres-
sivity when lifetime income is used to measure the impact of the tax. Nevertheless, some
economic agents with short-term foresight, or whose lack of resources prevents from
planning for the long-term, may care primarily about the effects of the tax in the short
run. In addition, taxation may also be regressive in other respects, namely gender or
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occupation. Part-time workers, who earn less but commute as much as full-time workers,
may be disproportionately hit by the tax. Similarly, it may disadvantage rural workers as
compared to town residents. These are perfectly legitimate worries. I argue, however,
that, even if these taxes are regressive, the distributional consequences of environmental
taxation could be addressed by income redistribution (Boyce, 2018). Environmental poli-
cies and distributive policies need not conflict with each other. Actually, a mix of envir-
onmental taxation and redistributive policies will respect freedom, responsibility and
fairness much more than the generalization of alternative currencies. For the latter
might make the poor much worse off than they are now, by strictly restricting their
real opportunities. As we shall see in the next paragraphs, the possibility to compensate
for such losses through income redistribution would be considerably reduced by such a
generalization. Contrary to environmental taxation, its defenders cannot (or with great
difficulties) appeal to income redistribution to compensate for its potential detrimental
effects on the most disadvantaged members of society.
Before turning to the next section, it might be useful to make clear that, though these
arguments suggest opposing the generalization of alternative currencies, they do not
reject the possibility to support them altogether. To repeat, the point is that their
growth would be both harmful and unnecessary, for other policies would achieve their
aim in a more just way. But there is still a place for small-scale experiments, limited
in scope and ambition, provided that they do not conflict with the demands of social
justice.
5. Effects on the possibility of redistributive policies
Restricting the purchasing power of money according to geographic or communitarian
criteria would harm justice for a third reason. Market societies generate substantial
unjust inequalities of power and of opportunity (Piketty, 2013). Justice demands to
reduce these inequalities, in part through taxation and redistribution of incomes and
wealth. Among egalitarians, there is a recurrent debate on the right pattern of distribution.
Some are in favour of radical distributive equality (e.g. Cohen, 2011) while others leave
room for possible acceptable inequalities (e.g. Rawls, 1999). I shall not propose a new
theory of distributive equality. I simply assume that the existence of unjust inequalities
makes some redistribution necessary.
Generalizing the use of alternative currencies would greatly undermine the mere pos-
sibility to implement redistributive policies or make redistribution so complex that
restricting money’s purchasing power would lose any relevance. Redistributive policies
rest on the capacity of the state to tax some people’s incomes in order to redistribute them
to other people. Taxation requires that all incomes are commensurable to each other: each
person’s income needs to be measured in a common unit so that all incomes are compar-
able, whatever the currency in which they are paid. Redistribution requires that currencies
are convertible into each other: otherwise, incomes taxed in area A in the form of cur-
rency A could not be transferred to area B under another monetary form.
Redistribution must take the form of money payments labelled in the currency effectively
used by the receiver: unconvertible currencies are worthless outside of their town or com-
munity of origin.
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Recall that alternative currencies can have an effective impact on the economy or the
environment only if they restrain economic activities locally, or within a given commu-
nity. This implies that their convertibility must be limited, for otherwise one could easily
avoid local restrictions by exchanging local money for universal money. Therefore,
increasing their weight in the economy would seriously impede redistributive policies,
by undermining the convertibility and commensurability of monetary incomes. To illus-
trate this point, consider an economy in which each town or region has its own currency
only valid locally and in which, therefore, all exchanges take place locally. In this
somehow extreme scenario, redistribution also takes place locally: each town’s rich citi-
zens pay taxes and each town’s poor citizens receive transfers funded by those local taxes.
Redistribution beyond the local level is impossible, for local currencies have no value
outside a given geographic area.
One could argue that political borders between countries also restrict the scope of
redistributive policies within a geographical area, and that this is often legitimate.
First, note that the latter claim is controversial. Several “cosmopolitan” theorists have
actually argued for global redistributive policies beyond borders (e.g. Van Parijs,
2007; Culp, 2014). Second, and most importantly, borders do not limit redistribution
in the same way than the implementation on a large scale of alternative currencies
would. It is in fact possible, and perhaps desirable, to transfer money to people in
other countries. Currently, rich countries do not transfer as much wealth to poor
regions as they possibly could. But it is up to these states’ political bodies to decide
whether to turn that possibility into policy. The large-scale implementation of alternative
currencies, however, would impede the mere possibility of redistributing wealth within a
wider political entity, whether or not it is deemed desirable to do so. For they must be
non-convertible in other currencies in order to achieve their objectives. Therefore,
whether the right scope of redistribution is national or whether it transcends national
borders, that extreme scenario would hinder redistributive policies in both cases.
Another possible reply to my objections is that nobody has in mind anything close to
that radical scenario. Universal currencies will always be dominant. Nowadays, after all,
exchanges and incomes labelled in alternative currencies are taxed according to the law
prevailing in the country where they take place. For instance, in Belgium, exchanges in
local currencies are subject to a VAT tax and incomes received in such currencies to an
income tax (Attout et al., 2013: 67–91). However, the law currently does not allow taxes
to be paid in these currencies, so firms must carry out a sufficient part of their sales in
euros.5
The problem is that allowing people to exchange or pay taxes in universal currencies
will weaken the ability of alternative currencies to effectively restrict exchanges locally
or within a community. As I have argued above, the capacity of alternative currencies to
effectively achieve sustainability or promote social cohesion depends on their ability to
restrict exchanges locally. The more we allow for universal currencies to circulate
alongside alternative currencies, the more we undermine the ability of alternative cur-
rencies to achieve their purpose, for people can escape restrictions by using euros or
dollars.
In short, there is a trade-off between the possible achievements of alternative curren-
cies and the requirements of just redistributive policies. The implementation of
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redistributive policies, on the one hand, calls for limiting the weight of alternative curren-
cies in the economy. Their environmental, economic or social goals, on the other hand,
appear to require a wider expansion of these currencies. What side of the dilemma should
we choose? Actually, there is no need to sacrifice income distribution for environmental
or social objectives. As I argued above, environmental taxation, for instance, can go along
with income redistribution (Boyce, 2018). And tax-funded social and cultural centres, or
public libraries, may bring about noticeable social benefits, without curtailing the redis-
tribution of incomes and wealth. To the extent that we can implement policies that do not
impede redistributive policies and that serve the same environmental or social purpose
than alternative currencies, we must call for restricting the scope of alternative currencies
in the economy.
In response, one could argue that alternative currencies need not be incompatible with
income redistribution. One could achieve commensurability and convertibility through a
complex system of multiple exchange rates (one for each currency compared to the
central unit of value), which would need to take into account each currency’s purchasing
power. A central agency could be in charge of computing and publishing these exchange
rates. There could also be an exchange market for alternative currencies, only available to
state authorities. The state could then tax incomes labelled in numerous kinds of different
currencies, compute their relative value, exchange them on the market, and then redistri-
bute them throughout the country.
One can expect that this complex scheme will raise many practical difficulties and give
rise to a huge bureaucratic machinery. It might also weaken the possibility to restrict a
currency’s purchasing power, as exchange markets will enable people to bypass such
restrictions. In sum, it is hard to imagine how this scheme could be made compatible
with justice in a way that is neither too complex nor a threat to its core objectives.
Building a more environmentally friendly economy is certainly a desirable goal, but
achieving such a goal through restricting the purchasing power of money is both undesir-
able and unnecessary compared to other alternative policies.
6. Conclusion
This paper argued that proponents of alternative currencies are stuck in a dilemma.
Currently, these currencies are far from providing an effective response to the ecological,
economic and social challenges that, according to their advocates, threaten our society
and our economy. However, turning these currencies into effective channels of change
might hurt justice, in a way that is perhaps not even necessary for achieving their objec-
tives. Imposing stricter restrictions on money’s purchasing power, even if it might lead to
valuable environmental or social benefits, would generate three kinds of injustice. It
would reduce people’s real opportunities, produce an unjust distribution of the burdens
of reducing environmental harm and hinder the possibility to redistribute incomes and
wealth. Moreover, these restrictions are disproportionate to their aim. Their detrimental
consequences on justice can hardly be justified by the pursuit of environmental or
social objectives, for there exist other reforms, such as environmental taxation or
publicly-funded social facilities, which may achieve similar objectives without curtailing
the pursuit of social justice.
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There is, perhaps, one way out of that dilemma. Faced with the current inability of
alternative currencies to fully fulfil their promises, and convinced that increasing the
scale at which alternative currencies circulate may be an unreachable objective, several
authors have argued that Local currencies, LETS, and Time Banks should be conceived
as vectors of contestation. North (2007) describes them as part of a social movement that
contests globalization, capitalism and impersonal market exchanges. Blanc (2018)
acknowledges that these currencies have failed to affect the economy or the environment,
but contends that it is often not their purpose (Blanc, 2018: 71–72). He argues that their
main aim is to transform the nature of exchanges, to question the current state of money
and to express one’s discontent about the prevalence of market values. He supports the
willingness of practitioners to build bottom-up alternatives to capitalism, whatever
their impact, and even if the scope of such experiments is limited.
Leaving aside the question of whether contesting globalization, markets or capitalism
is actually justified, one can still wonder whether, in practice, local currencies, LETS and
other similar currencies can provide effective channels of contestation. Their ability to
convey opposition to market values depends on their capacity to attract a sufficiently
large number of members and to persuade them of the worth of contesting markets
and capitalism. They need to appeal to people that are not already convinced by the neces-
sity to reform the monetary system or to create an alternative to the market. These are real
challenges. Williams et al. (2001) have shown that the British LETS mostly attracted poor
workers or unemployed people that used them mainly as a survival strategy. Similarly,
according to Gómez (2009), gaining additional revenues was the main motive of partici-
pation in Argentinian Trueques. Inclusion in a community can also constitute an import-
ant motive (Blanc, 2018: 61–62). However, even if some studies have shown that
political contestation constituted part of the appeal of some French LETS (Servet
et al., 1999), that motivation is not central to most alternative currency schemes
(Blanc, 2018: 61–62).
This paper could not find any strong reason to encourage the development of alterna-
tive currencies, and argued forcefully against increasing their weight in the economy.
However, there may be no reason to ban alternative currencies altogether. On the one
hand, if the size of such experiments stays small, they will not have any serious
impact on justice. On the other hand, liberal democracies guarantee the right of free asso-
ciation. This right includes the freedom to join and create small-scale local experiments,
such as local currency schemes or LETS. I do not intend to ban gifts or informal
exchanges. I do not want to blame employers who offer small in-kind benefits to their
employees, or people who exchange gifts with their neighbours and relatives.
Similarly, I admit that many employees, merchants and consumers may well freely
agree to accept such currencies in payment or find value in their voluntary involvement
in small-scale alternative currency schemes. Nevertheless, money’s polyvalence matters
for justice. It is crucial for the safeguard of everyone’s access to opportunities, as well as
for the design of just and efficient redistributive policies. Alternative currencies may
seem charming and harmless in their present form. However, the hope to see them
deliver significant benefits is unlikely to bear much fruit: either they stay small and
renounce impacting the world in a significant way; or they grow and risk threatening
social justice.
16 Politics, Philosophy & Economics 0(0)
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank John Eriksson, Clément Fontan, Marthe Nyssens, Camille
Pascal, Katarina Pitasse Fragoso, Pierre-Etienne Vandamme, Andrew Williams and
Danielle Zwarthoed, as well as two anonymous reviewers, for their insightful comments
and suggestions on this article.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
Notes
1. This also sets them apart from Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, which are valid across borders
and for all kinds of goods and services. See Larue (2020a).
2. See for instance Rawls (2005: 187) as well as Sen (1992: xi).
3. On the distinction between formal freedom and real freedom, see Van Parijs (1995: 23–24) and
Cohen (2011: 173–178).
4. Similarly, subsidies (for green energy, for instance) reward those whose actions benefit others.
These can be seen as “negative taxation”, for government subsidies are paid by collecting taxes.
5. Note that there are many possible tax exemptions, mostly in cases where these exchanges take
place “informally” (Attout et al., 2013: 71). Finally, when currencies are not convertible, there is
no standard defining how to value them, and therefore, no way to know how to tax exchanges
labelled in such currencies (Attout et al., 2013: 75). It means that, in practice, many exchanges
taking place within these schemes are exempt from taxation.
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